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LEGISLATION
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
A statute enacted by the recent Pennsylvania General Assembly provides as
follows: "Contribution shall be enforcible among those who are jointly or severally liable for a tort where, as between them, such liabilities are either all primary or all secondary."' Given a literal interpretation, this act completely abandons the last vestiges of the common law rule that there can be no contribution
among tortfeasors. The rule was first laid down in the English case of Merryweather v. Nixan,2 but a considerable number of exceptions to the general rule
are always stated,$ and it has been argued that the exceptions are so numerous
that there can no longer be said to be any general rule.'
It is not the purpose of this note to inquire into the nature of these exceptions, for the topic has been given frequent treatment by courts and writers of legal
treatises.6 In Pennsylvania, the leading case is that of Goldman et al. v. MitchellFletcher Co.,6 where, after an exhaustive review of the cases, the court concludes
that the general rule that there can be no contribution among tortfeasors applies
only where there has been an intentional .violation of the law, or where the
wrongdoer knows or is presumed to know that the act was unlawful. Further,
it is suggested that the general rule does not apply to torts which are the result
of mere negligence. It is with this latter contention that the courts in various
jurisdictions have not been in accord. However, in view of the recent legislation
now in force in Pennsylvania, 7 it would seem that any doubts on the matter are
now resolved in favor of allowing contribution in such cases." Assuming, for
the present, that Pennsylvania courts have accepted all the recognized exceptions
to the general rule of no contribution, the fact remains that prior to the act above
quoted, contribution among intentional tortfeasors was never allowed.' Therefore, if the statute is given its full legal portent, a considerable breach with the
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past occurs, in that as among intentional tortfeasors contribution may now be
allowed.
Several reasons are generally given as to why contribution should not be
permitted as between two or more persons who intentionally commit a tort, or a
crime which, at the same time, amounts to a tort. The first of these may best be
explained by the maxims Ex turpi causa, non oritur actio and In pari delicto,
potior est conditio defendentis. With these, and the doctrine of contributory
negligence, and clean hands in equity, courts have frequently reiterated their
determination not to aid a wrongdoer in his suit against another wrongdoer.
Logically, of course, one tortfeasor, be he negligently or intentionally such, who
has satisfied a judgment in full rendered against him and others, should have a
claim to contribution under the general quasi-contractual principle that "One who,
in the discharge of his own legal obligation, has done that which, as between
himself and another rested in equity and good conscience upon the other is
entitled to restitution of the benefit thereby conferred."' 0 Thus a refusal of
contribution to intentional tortfeasors, and allowance of it between those, for
example, whose liability arose by virtue of negligence or implication of law must
be rested on some other grounds. This has been done by proclaiming that, in
spite of their distaste for aiding tainted litigants, courts should, as a matter of
public policy, refuse contribution. Thus it is argued that past misconduct will
thereby be punished, and, in the case of a prospective wrongdoer, he will be
deterred from wrongdoing when he knows that if judgment is taken against him
and his allies, and he is forced to satisfy the entire amount, he can have no
prospect of recovering from the latter a proportionate share of the amount he
has paid. 1 It is hard to see how this reason would have any logic at all where
mere negligent tortfeasance is involved, or where liability arises by implication of
law, since in these cases there is no premeditated intent which the shadow of "no
contribution" is likely to deter. Moreover, even as regards intentional tortfeasors.
the validity of the argument is counterbalanced by the phenomenon that one
prospective evildoer may be tempted to try his hand at some wrongful act, knowing that if suit is brought against him and his co-tortfeasors, and the judgment
is satisfied by the latter, such latter cannot claim contribution from him, and he
may go unpunished, financially speaking, for the damage he has caused. 1 2 This,
it seems, was the conclusion reached by the House of Lords in Palmer v. Wick
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and Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co., 18 where the House refused to extend the
rule of no contribution to Scotland. It was there said, Lord Herschell speaking:
"On principle, I can see no reason why, when a joint judgment debt has resulted
from a joint wrong, each co-debtor should not pay his share; or why, if one be
compelled by the creditor to pay the whole debt, the other should be enabled to
go free. I am bound to say that it (the rule of no contribution) does not appear
to me to be founded on any principle of justice or equity, or even of public
policy."
The statute as enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature merely states that
contribution shall be enforcible among tortfeasors, provided of course they are
all of the same class. By this it would seem that intentional tortfeasors were
meant to be included. Though a statute derogating, as does this, from the
common law, has heretofore been strictly construed to comply with the prior
law, that rule of construction no longer prevails, and liberal construction is now
the order of the day. 14 It is submitted that the statute, if interpreted to allow
contribution among all joint or several tortfeasors, should have the salutary
effect of (1) clarifying the confusion created by the cases and (2) conforming
this exception to the general quasi-contractual principle already noted.
A.
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